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Abstract. This paper optimizes fuel tax, car ownership tax, highway tolls, and peak-time 
area pricing in Beijing with explicit consideration of marginal costs of public funds arising 
from these taxes and pricing. We establish two scenarios: scenario 1 optimizes the two taxes, 
tolls, and area pricing simultaneously; scenario 2 optimizes the two taxes and tolls without 
area pricing. Using Beijing’s parameters obtained from previous studies, our calculation 
results show that 1) the optimal area pricing is 50 CNY/entry; 2) Scenario 1 reduces the 
number of cars in peak time by more than 50%, but scenario 2 reduces it by 10%; 3) regardless 
of area pricing, fuel tax should be higher and car ownership tax lower. We do some sensitivity 
analyses to demonstrate the possible ranges of the tax and pricing instruments.    
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1. Introduction 
Heavy traffic congestion, which greatly increases travel time1, arises in Beijing due to the 
land use pattern. First, separation between living and working areas is relatively clear. The inner 
city provides about 70% of the job opportunities, while about 40% of the population live in the 
suburbs.2 Second, a U-shaped building height curve from the center to the suburb and an 
expansion of transportation networks have forced the city edge to expand, which leads to a 
further increase in car usage demand (Ding, 2013). However, it is difficult to change the land 
use pattern in the short term. 
Currently, air pollution is very severe in Beijing. The air pollution level increases from the 
suburbs to the center with the volume of cars (Jiming et al., 2000). 74% of CO and 67% of NOx 
in the atmosphere in Beijing come from vehicle exhaust (Hao and Wang, 2012), and about 30% 
of the variance in local 𝑃𝑀ଶ.ହ can be explained by traffic emissions (Zhang et al., 2016). It is, 
therefore, an urgent task to impose appropriate traffic policies to reduce traffic and car 
emissions. 
Car-related taxes and pricing are useful to control traffic congestion in the short as well as 
long term. When we optimize the car-related taxes and pricing, however, we should take 
account of the financial constraint of the tax and pricing and the deadweight losses arising from 
them. Parry and Bento (2001) state that road toll revenues must be used to reduce the 
distortionary taxation. Similar analyses, which optimizes the rates of the revenue items, have 
been conducted by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1997), Bento et al. (2014) and Kono 
et al. (2019).  
 
1 According to the Beijing Traffic Development Annual Report (2014), the average congestion time is about 2 
hours per day, and the average traffic speed on urban roads is only 23.2 km/h during the rush hours. 
2 Data from the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics. See website 
http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/tjsj/sjjd/201511/t20151123_321580.html  
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Many countries levy car-related taxes, and some of them impose highway tolls. But the 
annual tax on car ownership differs greatly across countries. The annual car expenditure of 
tax/toll items is shown in Figure 1.3 In France, Japan and China, highway users must pay tolls, 
while in some other countries they do not; in North European countries like Denmark and 
Finland, the car ownership tax is much higher than that in China and the US; while the fuel tax 
is similar across many countries. These large differences among countries may show that 
governments do not optimize the car-related tax items, and at least they show no world 
standards on their rates. Accordingly, in many countries, optimizing them may increase the 
welfare drastically. 
 
Figure 1. here 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, in China, the current fuel tax is relatively low. Since 1993, the volume 
of oil imports has increased by an enormous rate of 65% (He et al. 2005). At least in the short 
term, fuel tax can control the fuel consumption. Likewise, highway tolls can reduce the traffic 
on highways. In a relatively long term, car ownership tax affects car ownership, and therefore 
affects traffic demand. This implies that the revenue from the individual tax item depends on the 
other tax/toll rates through the change in traffic demand and car ownership. Accordingly, the 
government should optimize these tax/toll items simultaneously to increase the social welfare 
and to decrease the total tax distortions, given its fiscal constraint.  
 
3 The data of the annual expenditure on fuel tax and the annual average tax on car ownership and acquisition except 
China in Figure 1 are estimated by Japan’s Cabinet Office, and that on highway tolls comes from Kono et al. (2019) 
in yen. The data in China is calculated from the current highway toll, fuel tax and car ownership tax in 2010. For 
car identities, these data are based on the assumption that a consumer purchases a car of 2000 cc class for a unit 
price of $30,000, with mileage of 10,000 km annually for 6 years with annual fuel consumption of 1000 liters. 
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To take tax/toll distortions into account, we can use marginal cost of public funds 
(hereafter, MCF) to measure the tax efficiency. MCF is the direct tax burden plus the marginal 
welfare cost produced in acquiring the tax revenue (Browning, 1976). 4 According to the optimal 
tax theory, in order to optimize car-related taxes and highway tolls, the MCFs of these policy 
taxes/tolls should be at the same level as that of labor income tax.  
Many papers have explored the optimization of car-related taxes. Parry & Small (2005) 
develop an analytical framework of assessing the second-best optimal level of fuel tax 
considering unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with 
labor income tax. Lin & Zeng (2014) applied the same method to Chinese data to optimize fuel 
tax. However, these two studies considered only a single tax item. Anas et al. (2009) studied 
optimal congestion toll and fuel tax with a logit model and compared taxation efficiency with 
traffic-related externalities. However, they did not optimize the other tax/toll items. Fullerton & 
West (2010) considered multiple taxes for gasoline, engine size and vehicle age, to find the 
second-best policy for reducing the pollution in the U.S, but did not consider the government’s 
fiscal constraint. Tikoudis et al. (2015) consider this point and examine congestion taxes in a 
monocentric city, focusing on the differentiation of road taxes over space, because the labor 
supply elasticity and the marginal utility of income vary across locations. Hirte and 
Tscharaktschiew (2020) discuss the role of endogeneity of labor supply in shaping optimal 
transportation taxes. 
None of the previous studies, however, consider all the car-related pricing and tax 
instruments and the government fiscal constraint to find the optimal levels of them. To take 
 
4 In the optimal tax system, MCF should be 1 for both lump-sum tax and distortionary tax as Jacobs (2018) 
certified. Due to the empirical research of Liu (2009), China faces a relatively high MCF of labor wage tax ranging 
from 1.207 to 1.236. 
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account of them simultaneously, Kono et al. (2019) extend the work of Parry and Small (2005) 
to include all the car-related tax instruments (fuel tax, car ownership tax, and highway tolls), 
distortions of which simultaneously change through a change in the number of car trips in Japan. 
In addition, they explore how consolidating different fiscal constraints of transportation agencies 
affects optimal car-related taxes and tolls. 
This research is in the same vein as in the Japanese case by Kono et al. (2019). What is 
new, however, is that we introduce the area pricing, which has been successfully imposed in 
London, into Beijing to explore the optimal levels of the pricing and tax policies. We calculate 
the optimal rates in two scenarios. Scenario 1 simultaneously optimizes all taxes and congestion 
pricing; Scenario 2 optimizes fuel tax, car ownership tax, and highway tolls without area 
pricing.  
Using Beijing’s parameters, which we obtain from previous studies, our calculation results 
show that 1) the optimal area charge is 50 CNY/entry; 2) with the area charge, the number of 
cars in peak time is reduced by more than 50%, but without the charge, it is reduced by 10%; 3) 
regardless of the area pricing, higher fuel tax and lower car ownership tax should be imposed to 
reduce the marginal cost of public funds and air pollution and congestion externalities. 
Sensitivity analysis of the area charge elasticity of demand demonstrates that our assessment of 
multiple policy instruments falls within the practical range. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model, Section 3 
describes the related data in Beijing, and Section 4 demonstrates the results of the optimization 
and the sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2. Model and optimization of tolls and taxes 
2.1 Individual behavior 
To analyze the car-related system, we concentrate mainly on gasoline automobiles. The 
reason is that the private gasoline automobiles constitute the majority of the traffic in Beijing.5  
Consumers are heterogeneous in our model. Consumer 𝑖 can choose to own a car or not and 
choose to use the car for commuting in peak time or only for private purposes in off-peak time. 
Car ownership status is denoted by 𝛿௜: if consumer 𝑖 has a car and drives, then 𝛿௜ = 1; on the 
other hand, if he/she does not have a car and uses public transport, then 𝛿௜ = 0. In peak time, 
consumers commute to the center of Beijing by car or public transport. Car usage status is 
denoted by 𝜃௜, if consumer 𝑖 commutes by his/her own car, then 𝜃௜ = 1; on the other hand, 
when he/she commutes by public transport, then 𝜃௜ = 0. In off-peak time, consumers who have 
their own car drives for private purposes. We do not consider the consumers’ choices regarding 
where to live and where to work; that is, the average travel distance to the workplace and the 
number of days in work are given.  
Consumer 𝑖 drives on a highway for a distance of 𝑥ு௥௜  (km) and drives on urban roads for a 
distance of 𝑥௥௜  (km). Subscript r indicates the time differentiation between peak and off-peak 
periods: k and o represent the peak periods and off-peak periods, respectively. This makes the 
purpose of car usage elastic (that is, it is used for commuting or private purposes). Fuel 
efficiency on the highway is 𝑙ு (liter/km) while it is 𝑙 (liter/km) on the urban roads.6 Under this 
setting, the fuel consumption on the highway is ∑ 𝑥ு௥௜௥ ⋅ 𝑙ு (liter), and that on the urban roads is 
 
5 In the Beijing Traffic Development Annual Report (2011), the heavy-duty vehicles with higher emissions 
comprise only 7.3% of all the vehicle ownership, and they face restrictions in driving in the inner city, while the 
light diesel car also face restrictions in Beijing, see announcement Beijing Environment Development (2006), No 6. 
http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=lar541s118.txt. 
6 The symbol * denotes the optimal value in the model. A variable with an overline is a constant value. 
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∑ 𝑥௥௜ ⋅ 𝑙௥  (liter). Regardless of car ownership, consumers can commute by public transport for a 
travel distance of ipkx . In addition to ipkx , consumers who do not have a car use public transport 
for a travel distance of 𝑥௣௜  (km) for both commuting and private purposes. The existence of 
public transport makes the car ownership demand and car usage demand elastic.  
The annual car ownership tax contains an annualized purchase tax and an annual vehicle 
and vessel tax in China. The car ownership tax is denoted as s (CNY/year). Fuel tax is set at a 
rate of f (CNY/liter). Other expenditures like insurance, maintenance fees, and parking fees are 
included in annualized car price 𝑐 (CNY/year). The consumer has to pay the highway toll p 
(CNY/km) regardless of time periods if he/she drives on the highway. In peak time, a driver is 
charged on both highways and local roads on entering the central area of the city; thus, he/she 
have to pay the area charge pa whenever he/she commutes. The fare on public transport is 
denoted as 𝑝௣ (CNY).  Table 1 summarizes the taxes and congestion pricing the consumer has to 
pay.  
 
Table 1. here 
 
The budget constraint of consumer 𝑖 is, 
  
 
( )( )
                 1 ( )( )
                        1 ( ) ,
i i i i i i
a Hr H Hr r
r r
i i i i i
a Ho H Ho o p pk
i i i i
p p
z p p x f f l x l x s c
p px f f l x l x s c p x
p x w L
 

 
             
            
   
 
 (1) 
where 𝑧௜ denotes the composite goods with the price normalized to 1, f  is before-tax 
gasoline price (CNY/liter), 𝑤௜ (CNY/hour) represents wage rate of consumer 𝑖, 𝜏 expresses 
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labor tax rate and 𝐿௜ is the labor time. This budget constraint explains consumer 𝑖’s annual 
expenditure on highway driving, urban road driving, car ownership, public transport and his/her 
annual labor wage income.  
 To take congestion externality into account, we must consider consumer 𝑖’s time spent on 
the road. The time constraint contains leisure time 𝑦௜, labor time 𝐿௜, time spent on highways 𝑇ு௥ ∙ 𝑥ு௥௜  (hours) and on urban roads 𝑇௥ ∙ 𝑥௥௜  (hours) in peak or off-peak time, and time spent on 
public transport for commuting 𝑇௣ (hours/km). All the time spent should meet the budget of 
consumer 𝑖’s available time 𝑀. Eq. (2) represents consumer 𝑖’s aggregate annual time spent. 
 
 
( ) (1 )( ) (1 ) .i i i i i i i i i i i iHr Hr r r Ho Ho o o p pc p p
r
y L T x T x T x T x T x T x M                  (2) 
In this equation, travel time function on highways 𝑇ு௥ (hours/km) and on urban roads 𝑇௥ 
(hours/km) can measure the congestion level on the road in peak or off-peak time. Travel time 
per distance is determined by the total traffic demand on the respective road, 𝑇ு௥ = 𝑇ு௥(𝑋ு௥), 𝑇௥ = 𝑇(𝑋௥), (3) 
where 𝑋ு௥ ≡ ∑ 𝛿௜𝑥ு௥௜௜  is the total travel distance demand on highways in period r and 𝑋௥ ≡∑ 𝛿௜𝑥௥௜௜  is the total travel distance demand on urban roads in period r. Meanwhile, these 
functions satisfy 𝑑𝑇ு௥ 𝑑𝑋ு௥⁄ ≥ 0, 𝑑𝑇௥ 𝑑𝑋௥⁄ ≥ 0 because the more people drive, the more 
congestion is produced. 
The utility of each consumer is affected by not only monetary and time-related factors but 
also environmental quality. The air condition is poor in Beijing. We define the environmental 
damage caused by car use on highways as 𝐸ு and on urban roads as 𝐸. For a simple description 
of the real-life context, 𝐸ு and 𝐸 contain air pollution costs, noise costs and the greenhouse 
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effect. With technological development, tailpipe emissions now vary primarily with vehicle 
miles traveled (VMT) rather than total fuel consumption (Parry, et al., 2007). This implies that 
car-related environmental damage can be a function of total travel distance. Therefore, we can 
define the functions of 𝐸ு and 𝐸, respectively, as 𝐸ு = 𝐸ு(𝑋ு), 𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑋). (4) 
where XH  = XHk + XHo and X = Xk + Xo. We have 𝑑𝐸ு 𝑑𝑋ு⁄ ≥ 0, 𝑑𝐸 𝑑𝑋⁄ ≥ 0 here, as higher 
traffic volume brings more air pollution. 
The utility of consumer 𝑖 is determined by driving demand 𝑥ு௞௜ , 𝑥ு௢௜ , 𝑥௞௜ , 𝑥௢௜ , leisure time 𝑦௜, 
and environment factors EH and E, if he/she owns a car and drives in both peak and off-peak 
periods. The reason why total travel times 𝑇ு௥ and 𝑇௥ are not included is that drivers tend not to 
recognize the marginal increase in congestion they produce, since the individual travel demand 
can be negligible in relation to total traffic volume. Owing to a quasi-utility form, the utility can 
be measured in terms of monetary values. The utility function of consumer 𝑖 can be expressed as 
 
 ( , , , , , , )i i i i i i iHk Ho k o HU x x x x y E E z  ,  (5) 
where driving demands in peak time are replaced by public transport distance  ipx  if consumer i 
does not have a car. We assume that 𝜕𝑈௜ 𝜕𝜁⁄ ≥ 0, 𝜕𝑈௜ଶ 𝜕ଶ𝜁ൗ < 0, 𝜁 ∈ ൛𝑥ு௞௜ , 𝑥ு௢௜ , 𝑥௞௜ , 𝑥௢௜ , 𝑦௜ൟ. 
A rational consumer will always pursue the maximization of individual utility. To do this 
with the utility function in our model, we can substitute Eqs. (1) and (2) into Eq. (5), which 
yields 
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i i i i
o p pk p px s c p x p x      
 
 (6) 
From the first order conditions with respect to xHk, xHo, xk, xo, and y, we can obtain xHk, xHo, 
xk, xo, and y as functions of p, pa, f, and  . Labor supply change caused by driving demand 
change is not as sensitive as travel demand and car ownership because travel time and travel 
distance can hardly affect one’s labor time. We have * * ( , , , )i iHk Hk ax x p f p  , * * ( , , )i iHo Hox x p f   
* * ( , , , )i ik r ax x p f p  , * * ( , , )i io ox x p f  , and * * ( )i i iL L w   , excluding fixed variables for our 
analysis and external variables for consumers from the function such as ( , , , , ,Hk k Ho o HT T T T E E ). 
Superscript * represents the variables optimally chosen by consumers.  
Substituting the individual demand functions into the utility function (6), we can have the 
indirect individual utility, 
  
1c 1p
0
( , , , , , , , , , ) (1 ) ( , , , , , , )
    1 ( , , , )
i i i i i i
a Hk k Ho o H Ho o H
i i
p H
V v p f p T T T T E E v p f T T E E
v p E E
    
 
   
    (7) 
where vi1c is the utility of a car owner who commutes by car, vi1p is the utility of a car owner 
who commutes by public transport, and vi0 is the utility of a consumer who does not have a car. 
Thus, function 𝑉௜ represents the utility of car owner when 𝛿௜ = 1 plus the utility of a consumer 
using only public transport when 𝛿௜ = 0.  
The number of total cars is 𝑁ଵ = ∑ 𝛿௜௜ , and total number of cars in peak time is 
i i
k iN    . Utility of driving a car is determined by highway toll p, fuel tax f, area charge pa 
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as well as exogenous values like congestion level THr and Tr, { , }r k o , the environmental 
damage EH and E, as well as the labor wage tax 𝜏. As for the utility of public transport, the 
explanatory values are constant transport fare, environmental damage and a constant labor wage 
tax 𝜏. Regarding the value of  𝛿௜∗ , 𝛿௜∗ = 1 when 𝑣ଵ୮௜∗  > 𝑣଴௜∗; 𝛿௜∗ = 0 when 𝑣ଵ୮௜∗ < 𝑣଴௜∗. θi* = 1 
when 𝛿௜∗ = 1 and vi1c > vi1p; θi* = 0 when  𝛿௜∗ = 1 and vi1c < vi1p. We assume that labor tax τ 
does not affect car ownership and car usage. δi* is the function of fuel tax, car ownership tax, 
and highway toll as * *( , , )i i p f s  . θi* is the function of fuel tax, highway toll, and area 
charge as * *( , , )i i ap f p  . The change in the indirect utility level associated with toll 𝑝, fuel 
tax f, car ownership tax s, area charge pa, and labor tax τ can be obtained by the envelope 
theorem as 𝜕𝑉௜ 𝜕𝑝 = −𝛿௜∗(𝑥ு௞௜∗ + 𝑥ு௢௜∗ )⁄ , 𝜕𝑉௜ 𝜕𝑓 = −𝛿௜∗ ∑ (𝑙ு ⋅ 𝑥ு௥௜∗ + 𝑙 ⋅ 𝑥௥௜∗)௥⁄ , 𝜕𝑉௜ 𝜕𝑠 = −𝛿௜∗⁄ , * *i i iaV p      , and *i iV L    . 
Since we set a quasi-linear utility function, the marginal utility of generalized income is 
identical across consumers (the other choice variables for consumer—car ownership, 
transportation demand, car usage, and leisure time—are heterogeneous). Thus, the indirect 
utility function iV  represents a Gorman function. Hence, we can aggregate all consumers’ 
heterogeneous indirect utility functions. Substituting the demand functions into the utility 
function and aggregating the indirect utility function yields 
 

  
1c
1 1
1p 0
( , , , , , , , , , )
                      (1 ) ( , , , , , , ) 1 ( , , , ) ,
N Ni i i i
a Hk k Ho o H
i i
i i i i
Ho o H p H
V v p f p T T T T E E
v p f T T E E v p E E
  
   
 
 
   
 
  (8) 
where N is the total population. 
Applying the envelope theorem to the aggregated indirect utility function yields 
 
 * * * for , all  i i ii Hr Hr
i r r
V x X r k op 
   
   ,  (9) 
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* * *
i
i ii
k
ia
V Np  
  
  ,  (12) 
 
*
i
ii
i
V L
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  . (13) 
2.2 Transport-related agencies’ budget constraints 
In China, highways are constructed and maintained by highway companies. While some of 
these highway companies are independent and set their own tolling rates, most of the highway 
companies are owned by the government. All the car-related taxes and area charge are 
controlled by governments. In this study, we consider two transportation-related agencies: a 
highway company and the government.  
Government expenditure (without highway tolls) meets the revenue budget: 
 
 * * * * *
1 1
N Ni i i i i
a H Hr r
i r i
G K p f l x l x s L  
 
             ,  (14) 
where 𝐺 is the expenditure of Beijing’s government, and K represents the tax revenue. Total 
revenue is composed of area charge, fuel tax, car ownership tax, and labor wage tax revenue. 
The highway company manages the highway system. This company applies a loan from the 
bank to construct the roads and imposes tolls on vehicle users by distance or entrance times at a 
certain rate. When the highway company has a budget of their tolling revenue, 
 
* * *
1
( )N i i iHk Ho
i
H R p x x

   ,  (15) 
where 𝐻 denotes the expenditure on road construction and maintenance for independent 
highway companies, 𝑅 is the revenue which is collected from tolling on highways. 
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2.3 Two optimization scenarios 
We explore how to impose an area charge in the presence of existing distortionary taxes, 
and examine the impact of area pricing on car-related demands in Beijing through the numerical 
simulation. So we optimize multiple policy instruments in two scenarios. First, we explore the 
scenario where the government introduces area pricing and optimizes all car-related taxes and 
tolls; second, the government does not implement area pricing and optimize the other taxes and 
tolls that have already been imposed in Beijing. In other words, the second scenario optimizes 
the current taxes and tolls. To give a more specific view of these scenarios, we can exhibit the 
following mathematical definitions. 
Scenario 1 simultaneously optimizes highway toll 𝑝, fuel tax 𝑓, car ownership tax 𝑠, area 
charge in peak periods pa, and labor tax τ. The government uses tax revenues 𝐾 and highway toll 
revenue  𝑅 to meet the budget of highway expenditure 𝐻 and other government expenditures 𝐺. 𝑚𝑎𝑥{௣,௙,௦,௣ೌ,ఛ,௜∈(ଵ,ଶ,…ே)} ෍ 𝑉௜ே௜    𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐺 + 𝐻 = 𝐾 + 𝑅 (16.1) 
Scenario 2 optimizes highway toll 𝑝, fuel tax 𝑓, car ownership tax 𝑠, and the labor tax τ 
simultaneously without area charge pa. 𝑚𝑎𝑥{௣,௙,௦,ఛ,௜∈(ଵ,ଶ,…ே)} ෍ 𝑉௜ே௜     𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐺 + 𝐻 = 𝐾 + 𝑅 (16.2) 
2.4 Optimization of the social welfare 
To give a direct explanation of how to optimize policy instruments, we choose Scenario 1 
as an example. Maximizing Function (16.1), we have the following Lagrangian function. 
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The first order conditions of Function (16) are  
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where { , , , }aQ p f s p , and   
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Applying the envelope theorem to the indirect utility function, we can represent 
1
iN
i
dV
dQ  and 
dK dR
dQ
  of Eq. (17a) as the functions of observable economic variables. Note that the left-hand 
side of these equations is MCF (=  ). Hence, the right-hand sides of all the three equations 
should be equal.  
In the first order conditions, when policy variables change, 𝜑 is the ratio of the change of 
social welfare to the change of the government revenue.  We take one endogenous variable fuel 
tax 𝑓 as an example to express this ratio, which can be represented by, 
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where HH
H H
Eve N E X
    and 
v Ee N E X
     are both environmental externalities for one unit of 
driving on highways and local roads, and 
* *
f Hk Hk k k
k
Hk k
T X T Xt X f X f
         and  
* *
f Ho Ho o o
o
Ho o
T X T Xt X f X f
         are the marginal change in peak time and off peak time congestion 
externalities with respect to fuel tax, respectively. −𝜑 represents MCF of fuel tax. The right-
hand side of this equation is the ratio of social welfare change to the tax and toll revenue 
changes. The term  * *H Hr rr l X lX   is the change in the consumer surplus. The term  ቂ∑ ൫𝑙ு̅𝑋ு௥∗ + 𝑙?̅?௥∗൯௥ + డ ∑ (௟ಹ̅௑ಹೝ∗ ା௟௑̅ೝ∗)ೝ డ௙ 𝑓ቃ denotes the fuel tax revenue change, and 𝑝 ∑ డ௑ಹೝ∗డ௙௥ +𝑠 డேభ∗డ௙ + 𝑝௔ డேೖ∗డ௙   shows that these distortionary taxes and area charge can interact to determine 
the optimal policies. 
 
3. Case study of Beijing 
This research calculates the optimal rates of multiple taxes and congestion charge, using the real 
data in Beijing, including traffic demand elasticities, traffic externalities and current traffic 
condition data obtained from previous studies and our own estimation. The year is set at 2010, 
and the exchange rate is set as 6.77 CNY/USD in 2010. 
15 
 
3.1 Tax policy and highway tolls in Beijing 
In 2010 in Beijing, the highway tolls are imposed on all the highways, although the toll rates are 
slightly different.7 The average toll is 0.5 CNY/km. We set this average value as per-km toll. 
Fuel tax is 30-40% in the full gasoline price, and we set the fuel tax as 2.8 CNY/liter in our 
paper.8 Since the car ownership tax in China contains both a one-time purchase tax and a so-
called annual vehicle and vessel tax, this tax is set as 1686 CNY/year.9,10 
3.2 Parameters related to travel demand and car ownership demand 
3.2.1 The elasticities and the demand functions 
As shown in Section 2.1, we have derived consumer i’s car ownership decision as 
* *( , , )i i p f s  , consumer i’s car usage decision for commuting as * *( , , )i i ap f p  , and 
consumer i’s transport demands as * * ( , , )i iHk Hk ax x p f p , * * ( , , )i iHo Ho ax x p f p  , * *( , , )i ik k ax x p f p  , 
and * *( , , )i io o ax x p f p . According to eqs. (9)–(13), the aggregated transportation demand and car 
ownership demand are * * * * * ( , , , )i i iHk Hk Hk aiX x X p f s p   , 
* * * * * ( , , , )i i iHo Hk Ho aiX x X p f s p   , * * * * * * *( , , , )i i i i ik k c k k aiX x N x X p f s p      ,
* * * * *( , , , )i i io o o aiX x X p f s p   , * * *1 1 ( , , )iiN N p f s   , 
* * * *( , , , )i ik k aiN N p f s p   , and the total labor supply is * * ( )ii L L  . Since we do not 
 
7 The levy standard of highways in Beijing is posted on the official website of the Beijing Municipal Commission 
of Transport, http://jtw.beijing.gov.cn/xxgk/jtgf/. 
8 Fuel tax details can be checked on the official website of the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of 
China http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201412/t20141212_1166868.html . But, each one liter of 
product oil, other than the original price, a 22-cent consumption tax, a 17% value-added tax and additional taxes are 
contained, so there is around 38%-42% fuel tax in the retail price. In 2010, average gasoline price in Beijing is 1 
dollar. 
9 The car ownership tax in China contains the one-time car purchase tax and a vehicle and vessel tax, see the 
official site of Beijing Local Taxation Bureau, http://shiju.tax861.gov.cn/bjds/swcx/ssfgcx/index.asp. As in our 
assumption, for a car of 2000 cc class for a unit price of $30,000, the annual car ownership tax can be calculated on 
the website http://auto.sina.com.cn/calculator/. 
10 In China, the average lifespan of cars is 14.5 as the research of Hao, Wang, Ouyang and Cheng (2011) revealed. 
See the details in Science China Press, volume 41, 2011.  
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consider the endogeneity of where to live and where to work, the average distance of one-day 
commuting and the number of working days per year are both constant. So, the following 
relationship is satisfied: * ( )k Hk kN X X m  , where m  represents the total trip length for 
commuting per year. 
We set the aggregated indirect utility function as the following quadratic form:   
1
2 2 2 2
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  (19) 
where eH and e are parameters representing the welfare effect of environmental externalities 
including air pollution, noise, and global warming for highway and urban roads.  
Equation (19) yields a linear form of transportation demand functions, the car ownership 
function, and total labor supply function: Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk aX p f s p          for highway 
in peak periods, Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho aX p f s p          for highways in off peak periods, 
k k k k k k aX p f s p          for local roads in peak periods, 
o o o o o o aX p f s p          for local roads in off-peak periods, 
1 1 1 1 1N N N NN p f s        for total number of cars, and i L Li L     .11 In this process, 
we have to take account of so-called integrability conditions from the demand and supply 
 
11 Other forms can be assumed. Nevertheless, constant elasticity demand function is not appropriate for our model 
because one distortion cannot be treated properly, as shown in Morisugi and Kono (2012). In the current paper, 
deadweight losses arising from tax play an important role in determining the tax rates. In the linear demand function, 
the deadweight losses can be calculated by triangles. Actually, triangles can approximate the area of deadweight 
losses shaped by some nonlinear demand functions. Therefore, we use the linear form demand function. The linear 
form of demand can be derived from a quadratic form of utility function such as in Ottaviano et al. (2002).  
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functions to the aggregated indirect utility function. That is, it is necessary for us to set the 
parameters of the demand and supply functions which have the utility function generating the 
demand functions.  
We calibrate the parameters in these demand functions by evaluating the price elasticities of 
car-related demands. For example, if we know the total highway driving demand in peak periods 
and highway toll rate, the gradient of highway toll in highway road driving demand function 𝛽ு௞ can be obtained by the highway toll elasticity of highway driving distance demand. By the 
same mechanism, we can obtain the rest of the parameters in demand functions of 𝑋ு௥, 𝑋௥, and 𝑁ଵ. The demand function of Nk can be obtained from * ( )k Hk kN X X m  . We set m  as 
Beijing’s average one-day commuting distance, 19.2 km, multiplied by 245 work days 
(Engelfriet and Koomen, 2018). Meanwhile, because the demand functions are generated by the 
utility function, so an integrability condition (or the symmetry of second derivatives) must be 
satisfied, the parameters in these demand functions must follow certain rules as shown in 
Appendix D.  
The number of vehicles in Beijing in 2010 is 4.809 million, and the average driving demand 
is evaluated as 21,161 kilometers/car per year,12 and it is assumed that the traffic demand on 
highways is 18.3% of total traffic demand.13 Based on these data, we can obtain the total traffic 
demand on highways in Beijing of 18,622,674,567 kilometers, and the total traffic demand on 
urban roads of 83,140,574,433 kilometers in 2010.  
Using the integrability condition (or the symmetry of second derivative) of well-behaved 
utility functions (as shown in Appendix C) and the assumption that the elasticity in peak time is 
 
12 See the Beijing Traffic Development Annual Report (2011). 
13 The source of this proportion is the Chinese Highway Road Trip Report by Gaode Map (in Chinese), see 
http://report.amap.com/download_city.do. 
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40% lower than that in off-peak time, we can evaluate some elasticities. We need to calibrate the 
parameters in the demand functions. We set the toll elasticity of the highway traffic demand in 
peak time and in off-peak time as -0.32 and -0.53, respectively; the toll elasticity of the urban 
road traffic demand in peak time and off-peak time is 0.19 and 0.32, respectively; the toll 
elasticity of car ownership demand is -0.06. We do not obtain the area charge elasticity of 
demand in Beijing because there is no area charge for vehicles entering the central area of 
Beijing. There are some cities, however, that do impose area charge for them, such as London, 
Stockholm, and Singapore. We use Singapore’s area charge elasticity of travel demand in peak 
periods estimated by Olszewski and Xie (2005), and we set that in off-peak periods (cross 
elasticity of demand) as 0.01 for both highways and urban roads.  
As a result, we can obtain the parameters of highway tols, fuel tax, car ownership tax, area 
pricing as βୌ୩ = −1311036290, γୌ୩ = −20484942, 𝜂ு௞ = −63075, and 𝜁ு௞ = −128790, 
respectively. Applying the same technique, we can calculate the remaining parameters. The 
demand functions by our estimation are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
3.2.2 Parameters of environmental externalities 
It is well-known that in Beijing air pollution has become a major problem especially since car 
ownership began to grow in 2000. To study the social environmental externality caused by 
traffic, two aspects of gasoline-related pollution should be studied, one being urban air 
pollution, and the other being global air pollution.  
The local air pollution includes particulate matter like 𝑃𝑀ଶ.ହ and 𝑃𝑀ଵ଴, as well as carbon 
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monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxide (NOଡ଼) and hydrocarbons (HC). Carbon monoxide (CO) has the 
effect of reducing oxygen in the bloodstream causing breathing difficulties and cardiovascular 
problems; nitrogen oxide (NOଡ଼) and hydrocarbons (HC) react in sunlight to form ozone, 
affecting pulmonary function in children and asthmatics and reducing visibility. Particulate 
matter (𝑃𝑀ଶ.ହ) is small enough to reach lung tissue, and studies have documented a causal 
relation between particle exposure and mortality (Dockery et al., 1993). The local air pollution 
externality డ௩భ೔∗డா డாడ௑ is calculated by Tong et al. (2014) with the willingness to pay method and the 
human capital resource method, considering mainly the human health effect. The cost of traffic-
related air pollution in 2011 in Beijing is around 1516 billion CNY, equal to 0.65% of the 
Beijing GDP in 2011. According to Tong et al., the traffic-related local pollution externality is 
set as 0.078 CNY/km per car, and traffic noise externality is 9.4×10-4 CNY/km. 14 
The marginal cost of greenhouse gas is calculated by the cost of carbon per ton, as marginal 
damage from additional global warming rises with temperature level (Parry et al., 2007). An 
analysis by Tol (2005) suggests a current upper bound cost of $340 per ton. If we assume that a 
gallon of gasoline contains 0.0024 tons of carbon (National Research Council, 2002), the 
marginal cost of global air pollution is 0.16 CNY/liter of gasoline. We assume the fuel 
efficiency of an automobile on urban roads 𝑙 is 10.87 km/liter, and the fuel efficiency on 
highways 𝑙ு is 1.5 times that on urban roads.15 Thus, the marginal cost of global warming can be 
set as 0.015 CNY/km. 
 
14 Meanwhile, the marginal local air pollution cost in Los Angeles is evaluated as 2.3 cents/mile (1.43 cents/km) for 
the year 2000 (Small & Kazimi, 1995); the marginal cost of local air pollution of Japan is set as 1.8 cents/km with a 
range of 1.1-2.6 cents/km by Kono, et al. (2016). 
15 This value is evaluated from the data in Kang, et al. (2015) (in Chinese) by Innovation Center for Energy and 
Transportation. 
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3.2.3 Traffic congestion externality 
Each car drives on the road, which slows down the other cars. This is external cost of congestion 
that is not paid by the individual road user, as illustrated by Creutzig and He (2009). We apply 
their calculation method for congestion. 
Each driver pays a constant amount for each km, reflecting fuel and other operating costs 
Ifix. Each driver values the time spent on the road. With increased road density q that is 
interpreted as cars per road capacity, the speed s(q) decreases. The individual cost function is  
fix( ) VOT ( )pI q I n s q  , where VOT is the value of time (CNY/hour) and np is the average 
number of passengers per car. The speed is assumed to be a linear function of road density: 
( )s q q   . The higher q is, the more each additional car slows down other cars. The 
marginal external cost with respect to q is obtained by differentiating I(q) with respect to q times 
q:  2( ) VOT 1 ( )pqdI q dq q n s q .  We calculate the marginal cost of congestion in each road 
type and time period. Our parameters are obtained from Creutzig and He (2009): VOT = 40.0 
(CNY/hour), np = 1.13, α = 60 for highway, α = 30 for local roads, and the speed in the 
reference situation is 25 km/hour for highway in peak time, 50 km/hour for highway in off-peak 
time, 15 km/hour for local road in peak time, and 22 km/hour for highway in off-peak time, 
respectively. 
3.2.4 Marginal cost of public funds in China 
The marginal cost of public funds is the measurement of the deadweight loss. Liu (2009) builts a 
general equilibrium model to evaluate the MCF in China. By increasing major tax rates by 1%, 
and checking the consumer’s utility and government revenue changes, MCF can be calculated. 
When the saving elasticity is in the range of 0-0.4, and labor supply elasticity ranges from 0 to 
0.15, the MCF of labor wage tax ranges from 1.207 to 1.264. From this, for the base dataset of 
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the current study, we choose the mean value of 1.24.16 We set the parameters on the labor supply 
function so that MCF is equal to the current MCF in China by using the current average labor 
tax. The estimated labor supply function is determined as 
6 416265.3 10 62413.9 10ii L    . 
3.3 Summary of all the parameters in this study 
Table 3 summarizes the parameters we use in our calculation. This includes the price/tax 
elasticities of car-related demands, air pollution externalities, and the value of time in Beijing.  
Table 3.  here  
 
4. Optimal levels of tolls and car-related taxes in Beijing 
4.1 Efficient taxation levels in different scenarios 
In this section, we calculate the optimal levels of highway toll, fuel tax, car ownership tax, and 
area charge on vehicles entering the city center.17 Table 4 shows the optimal values for two 
scenarios. Table 5 shows the impact of optimization on travel demand, external costs, and 
welfare. 
Table 4. here 
Table 5. here 
 
In Scenario 1, we can obtain that the optimal highway toll is 0.39 CNY/km, fuel tax is 6.9 
CNY/liter, car ownership should be 722 CNY/year, and area charge should be 50 CNY per car. 
 
16 Compared to other forms of taxation, the labor wage tax in China is relatively high, for example, the MCF of 
transportation and postal service business tax is 1.184, and the MCF of light-industry add-value tax is 1.099. It 
means that compared to labor wage tax, the light-industry add-value tax or transportation and postal service 
business tax should be at higher rates to balance the tax system and reduce the tax distortion. 
17 Let |𝐻| be a bordered Hessian matrix and in the numerical simulation the Hessian is negative definite because the 
determinants of the bordered presenting principal minor matrices |𝐻ଶ| > 0 , |𝐻ଷ| < 0 and |𝐻ସ| > 0 . So, in the numerical simulation, the second order of the optimization is satisfied, and optimal solution is globally unique. 
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Comparing scenario 1 with the reference situation, we find that fuel tax should be more than 
twice as high as the reference level but car ownership tax should be lower than the reference 
level. In Scenario 2, to reduce the marginal cost of public funds, car ownership tax should be set 
at 148 CNY/year, which is substantially smaller than the reference situation. Instead, the 
higher highway toll and fuel tax should be set.  Consequently, in both scenarios, higher fuel tax 
and lower car ownership tax are effective. According to Lin and Zeng (2014), who consider the 
MCF of labor wage tax, the optimal fuel tax in Beijing is 16.8 CNY/liter without considering 
multiple taxes. As we must maintain the highway traffic volume at a level high enough to 
prevent highway companies’ revenue from falling too much, we cannot impose fuel tax at the 
rate estimated by Lin and Zeng (2014).  
With regard to the change in travel demand, the smaller highway toll in Scenario 1 makes 
off-peak highway demand increase by 11%. However, because of the area pricing, highway and 
local road demands in peak time decrease by 28 % and 63 %, respectively. In addition, the 
number of cars in peak time is reduced by 56 % in Scenario 1, but it is reduced by 10 % in 
Scenario 2 where there is no area pricing. This means that many people commute by public 
transport. A different situation appears in Scenario 2, in which the peak time highway demand 
increases by 7.1 % and peak time local road demand decreases by 10 %. This is because there is 
no area pricing and car ownership tax is much less than the current rate. In the two scenarios, 
total number of cars is reduced by more than 20 %. As shown in Table 2, the marginal change in 
demand with respect to fuel tax, which is coming from the fuel tax elasticity of demand, is much 
larger than that with respect to the car ownership tax. Thus, the total number of cars is reduced 
even though the car ownership tax is reduced. 
With regard to the external costs, the total external costs are reduced by 61 % in Scenario 1 
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and 44 % in Scenario 2. The welfare gain per car is 11400 CNY for Scenario 1 and 8300 CNY 
for Scenario 2. Comparing the two scenarios, welfare gain per car increases by 3000 CNY by 
introducing area pricing. These gains are large, so area pricing should be introduced, while 
simultaneously optimizing multiple policy instruments. 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Since Beijing does not use area pricing on vehicles entering the city center, we use Singapore’s 
area charge elasticity of both highway and local road demand in peak time. In Figure 2, we vary 
the elasticity, holding all other parameters at their values shown in Table 1. “X” denotes the 
benchmark optimal level of each instrument, which indicates the results of Scenario 1 in Table 
4.  
In the cases where the parameter is more than - 0.1, the optimal level of highway toll, fuel 
tax, and car ownership tax varies by less than 10 % from the benchmark optimal level. In all 
parameter values, the optimal fuel tax is between 6.7 and 6.9 CNY/liter, and the highway toll is 
between 0.35 and 0.4 CNY/km. This implies that the value of these instruments is robust. It is 
natural that area charge is the most sensitive to the parameter. The value varies between 30 and 
130 CNY/entry as we cover the range of the parameter. The real values in several cities are 116 
CNY/day in London (£11.5), 9.5 to 35 CNY/entry in Stockholm (10 to 35 SBK), and 0 to 14.9 
CNY (0 to 3.0 SGD) in Singapore.18 Comparing our assessment of area pricing with the real 
value, this value is valid. 
 
Figure 2. here 
 
18 The congestion charge levels in London, Stockholm, and Singapore are obtained from the Tristate Transportation 
Campaign, 2017. “Road pricing in London, Stockholm and Singapore. A way forward for New York City”. We use 
10.12 CNY/GBP, 0.95 CNY/SEK, and 4.97CNY/SGD in 2010. 
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5. Conclusions 
We explored an efficient level of area pricing, considering pre-existing distortionary taxes such 
as highway toll, fuel tax, car ownership tax, and labor tax in Beijing; we also explored the 
effects of introducing the optimized area pricing on the travel demand. The importance of 
considering the marginal cost of public funds arising from labor wage tax is discussed by Parry 
& Small (2005), Bento et al. (2014), and Kono et al. (2019), among others.  
Using the available parameters in Beijing, our best assessment is that the optimal level of 
area charge is 50 CNY/year, fuel tax is more than double and the car ownership tax is less than 
half its current rate, and highway toll depends on whether area pricing is implemented or not. 
Our model considers the interaction between the multiple policy instruments through car usage 
demand. According to the price elasticity of demand and the parameter estimation of demand 
functions, the marginal change in demand with respect to fuel tax is much larger than that with 
respect to the car ownership tax. This means that to control the heavy traffic congestion in 
Beijing and the tax distortion, higher fuel tax and the lower car ownership tax is better. Area 
pricing is substantially effective because the number of cars in peak time is reduced by 56 % 
with area pricing, but it is reduced by only 10 % without area pricing. 
This study does not consider redistribution policies. Governments should consider how to 
balance efficient policies and redistribution policies. Also, in our research, the traffic demands 
are average values of all consumers in one year. In future studies, we can explore more 
possibilities with different categories of cars and consumer income levels, since the demand 
elasticity can vary between these categories, as do the optimized taxes and tolls. In the future, 
focus should be put on geographical characteristics within different districts. Another crucial 
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point is that this research is limited to one city. We assume no variance in fuel consumption in 
our Beijing study. This leads to the problem that even in areas with different congestion levels, 
the fuel tax cannot vary too much due to the possibilities of arbitrage. To solve this problem, the 
government should impose a distance tax to control the congestion problem in the long term.   
 
Appendix A. Car-related regulations in Beijing 
In Beijing, several regulations have been implemented to restrict the growing demand for car 
use. Such policies include, first, driving restriction policy in 2008.19 On each weekday, whether 
a vehicle may be driven or not depends on the last digit of the license plate. Driving restriction 
is not as effective as was intended in controlling car trips, as rule-breaking behavior is constant 
and pervasive (Wang, et al., 2014). Second, a diversified parking fee policy was introduced in 
2011. This policy aimed to restrict parking in old districts of the city, forcing vehicles to drive 
outside the CBD. Some companies in the inner city offer parking subsidies to offset this 
restriction, which makes parking control ineffective, too. Third, purchase restriction policy20 was 
implemented in 2011. Citizens must enter a lottery to win to buy a vehicle. According to Yang 
et al. (2014), the purchasing lottery policy cannot significantly decrease fuel consumption in 
Beijing.  
Appendix B. Problems with constant elasticity demand functions 
If we assume constant elastic demand functions, our model encounters a problem. We explain 
the problem using highway demand. To simplify the explanation, we suppose there are no 
congestion or environmental externalities (i.e., 𝜕𝑇ு௥ 𝜕𝑋ு௥⁄ = 0, 𝜕𝑇௥ 𝜕𝑋௥⁄ = 0, 𝜕𝐸ு 𝜕𝑋ு⁄ = 0 
 
19 See the details on the website of Beijing’s government: http://www.beijing.gov.cn/bmfw/jtcx/zcwj/t1513910.htm 
(in Chinese). 
20 See the details on the website of the Chinese government: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-
12/24/content_1771918.htm (in Chinese). 
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and 𝜕𝐸 𝜕𝑋⁄ = 0）and no fuel tax (i.e. 𝑓 = 0). The optimal toll condition is reduced to −𝑋 (𝑋 + 𝑝 𝑑𝑋 𝑑𝑝⁄ = 𝑀𝐶𝐹⁄ . If we apply a constant elastic demand (e.g.ln(𝑋) = 𝛼 + 𝜀௑ln (𝑃)) 
to this condition,  −1 (1 + 𝜀௑) = 𝑀𝐶𝐹⁄ . However, 𝜀௑ is constant while MCF is also 
exogenously constant, which implies that this optimal condition does not hold generally. 
Therefore, we cannot use constant elastic demand functions in our model. 
Appendix C. Integrability conditions and calibration of the 
parameters of demand functions 
To satisfy integrability conditions (i.e., in order to set the utility function which can generate the 
demand functions), we have 
2 2 ( )
,  or ,  or ( )
i i Hr H Hr r
i i r r
Hr H Hr r
r r
X l X lXV V l lp f f p f p   
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where { , }r k o .The other parameters of the demand functions are derived by using eqs. (A7)–
(A9). 
As the integrability conditions hold, we can calculate the fuel tax elasticity of both highway 
traffic demand and urban road traffic demand 𝐸௙௑ಹ  and 𝐸௙௑ by 
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⎩⎨
⎧ 𝑙ு ⋅ 𝐸௙௑ಹ ⋅ 𝑋ு𝑓 + 𝑙 ⋅ 𝐸௙௑ ⋅ 𝑋𝑓 = 𝐸௙ி ⋅ 𝐹𝑓𝐸௙௑ಹ ⋅ 𝑋ு𝑓 + 𝐸௙௑ ⋅ 𝑋𝑓 = 𝐸௙௏ெ் ⋅ 𝑋ு + 𝑋𝑓 , (𝐴7) 
and the highway toll elasticity of both highway traffic demand and urban road traffic demand 𝐸௣௑ಹ and 𝐸௣௑ by 
⎩⎨
⎧𝑙ு ⋅ 𝐸௣௑ಹ ⋅ 𝑋ு𝑝 + 𝑙 ⋅ 𝐸௣௑ ⋅ 𝑋𝑝 = 𝐸௙௑ಹ ⋅ 𝑋ு𝑓𝐸௣௑ಹ ⋅ 𝑋ு𝑝 + 𝐸௣௑ ⋅ 𝑋𝑝 = 𝐸௣௏ெ் ⋅ 𝑋ு + 𝑋𝑝 . (𝐴8) 
We assume that the ratio of traffic growth rate on highways and urban roads, 𝑋ு 𝑋⁄ , is fixed 
mainly because we cannot sufficiently forecast the growth rates separately. As a result, we can 
calculate the car ownership tax elasticity of highway traffic demand 𝐸௦௑ಹ and urban road traffic 
demand 𝐸௦௑ based on (A7). Eୱଡ଼ౄ = Eୱଡ଼ = E୤୒భ ⋅ Nଵf ⋅ sF . (A9) 
To estimate the car ownership tax elasticity of car ownership demand, we assume car 
ownership demand in China is a function of GDP per capita, car price index and consumer mind 
index. All the data come from the Beijing Statistical Yearbook (2002-2012). The function is 𝑙𝑛( 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛( 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝜂 𝑙𝑛( 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ) + 𝜆 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) . (𝐴10) 
 
Table A2 Estimation of car price elasticity of car demand  
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value P-value 
Intercept 1.4146268 4.69 0.304 0.770 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 0.35821941 0.155 2.32 0.0536 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 -0.732729 0.413 -1.774 0.119 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 -0.3661433 0.629 -0.582 0.579 
28 
 
 
Regression Statistics 
Adjusted R Square 0.971 
Observations 11 
Car ownership tax elasticity of car ownership demand is -0.006 under the assumption that 
the annual car ownership tax in Beijing is 249 dollars a year and the price of a car is 30,000 
dollars. 
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Table 1. Policy instruments 
  Highway Local road 
 taxes for all car users  Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak 
Peak time area pricing  pa - pa - 
Highway toll  p p - - 
Fuel tax  F  
Car ownership tax S  
 
Table 2. Parameters in linear demand functions  
 Toll p Fuel tax f Car owner tax S 
Area charge 
pa Intercept 
XHk  (Highways, peak) -13110.4 ×105 -20484.9 ×103 -63075 -128790 30848.6 ×105 
XHo  (Highways, off-peak) -17568.6 ×106 -27229.0 ×104 -510338 98305 26815.6 ×106 
Xk  (Local roads, peak) 34752.8 ×105 -39194.8 ×104 -281599 -574981 89800.6 ×105 
Xo  (Local roads, off-peak) 47356.9 ×106 -52853.7 ×105 -22784.0 ×102 438879 68217.1 ×106 
N1  (Total number of cars) -573413 -270678 -29 - 59017.0 ×102 
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Table 3. Summary of parameters 
Parameters Value Source 
Local air pollution externalities (CNY/km) 0.078 Tong et al. (2014) 
Global air pollution externalities (CNY/km) 0.015 Tol. (2015) 
Average fuel efficiency on highways (km/liter) 16.35 Kang et al. (2015) 
Average fuel efficiency on urban roads (km/liter) 10.87 Kang et al. (2015) 
MCF of labor wage tax 1.207-1.26 Liu (2009) 
Average driving demand per car (km) 21,161 Annual report 2011 
Car ownership in Beijing (million) 4.809 Annual report 2011 
Value of time (CNY/hour) 40.0 Creutzig & He (2009) 
Average labor wage tax (cents/hour) 62.4 Estimated from Beijing Local Taxation Bureau.21 
Fuel tax elasticity of fuel consumption -0.172 Lin & Zeng (2014) 
Fuel tax elasticity of car ownership -0.158 Lee & Kang (2015) 
Fuel tax elasticity of total traffic distance -0.164 Lee & Kang (2015) 
Car ownership tax elasticity of car ownership -0.01 Our estimation 
Highway toll elasticity of total traffic distance -0.30 Fu & Gu (2017) 
Area charge elasticity of peak time highway demand   -0.106 Olszewski & Xie (2005) 
Area charge elasticity of off-peak time highway demand 0.01 Our assumption 
Area charge elasticity of peak time urban road demand -0.106 Olszewski & Xie (2005) 
Area charge elasticity of off-peak time urban road demand 0.01 Our assumption 
* The exchange rate is set as 6.77 CNY/USD in 2010.  
 
Table 4. Optimal level of multiple policy instruments 
 Reference (Present level) 
1) Simultaneous 
  optimization  
2) Without area 
  Pricing 
Marginal cost of public funds  1.24 1.24 
Highway toll (CNY/km) 0.5 0.39 0.55 
Fuel tax (CNY /liter) 2.8 6.9 7.7 
Car ownership tax (CNY/year) 1686 722 148 
Area charge (CNY/entry) - 50 - 
 
21 The average annual working time in Beijing is 2318.95 hours, working population is 5,876,526 in 2010, and the 
total labor wage revenue is 8.51 billion dollars in 2010. 
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Table 5. The impact of optimization on travel demand, external costs, and welfare  
 Reference (Present level) 
1) Simultaneous 
  optimization 
2) Without area  
pricing  
Marginal cost of public funds  1.24 1.24 
Travel demand (km/car/year)  Percentage change w.r.t. reference level 
Peak highway 
Off-peak highway 
Peak local road 
Off-peak local road 
426 
3446 
1902 
15387 
- 28 % 
11 % 
- 63 % 
- 30 % 
7.1 % 
- 9.9 % 
- 14 % 
- 28 % 
Number of total cars (millions) 4.8 - 21 % - 27 % 
Number of cars in peak periods (millions) 2.6 - 56 % - 10 % 
External costs (106 CNY/year): air pollution + greenhouse gas emissions + noise + congestion 
   Peak highway 
Off-peak highway 
Peak local road 
Off-peak local road 
Total 
5377 
4554 
28417 
62233 
100582 
- 71 % 
- 9.0 % 
- 94 % 
- 50 % 
- 61 % 
40 % 
- 30 % 
- 43 % 
- 53 % 
- 44 % 
Speed (km/h)    
Peak highway 
Off-peak highway 
Peak local road 
Off-peak local road 
25 
50 
15 
22 
35 
52 
24 
24 
23 
53 
17 
24 
Welfare gain (103 CNY/car/year)  11.4 8.3 
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Figure 1. Annual car expenditure on taxes and tolls ($/year) (Ministry of Finance, Japan, 
2011; data on China and highway tolls added by the authors) 
 
   
 
Figure 2. Sensitivity of optimal policy instruments to parameter variation 
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